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HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY: THEY
WOULD RATHER FIGHT THAN SWITCH
In the past ten years, nearly 15,000 people were discharged
from the military for being homosexual. 1 The number of homosexual discharges is rising yearly.2 The figures, however, do not accurately reflect the number of homosexuals in the armed forces
because most are not detected by military authorities. 3 Various
studies have shown that seventy-five to eighty percent of all homosexual soldiers, including a number of officers, successfully complete their terms of service. 4 Yet, despite their apparent ability and
patriotism, homosexual soldiers continue to be discharged from military service in contravention of their constitutional right to
privacy.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized a constitu5
tional right to privacy in matters concerning personal autonomy.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right that is peripherally re6
lated to other rights explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
Although the Court has been reticent to recognize explicitly the
right to participate in consensual sexual relations, 7 the language in
earlier privacy decisions implicitly leads to such a conclusion.8
1. Kulieke, Military Spends Millions to Exclude Gays, The Advoc., Nov.
27, 1984, at 8, col. 1 (overview of recent military policy towards gays); see also T.
STODDARD, E. BoGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LISTER & J. Rupp, THE RIGHTS OF GAY
PEOPLE 36 (1983) (an American Civil Liberties Union Handbook) [hereinafter
cited as RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE]. For a general discussion of the earlier treatment of homosexuals in the military, see C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 28, 53 (1971).
2. Kulieke, Military Spends Millions to Exclude Gays, The Advoc., Nov.
27, 1984, at 8, col. 1. Since 1974, 14,311 armed services members have been dismissed for being gay or lesbian; the numbers have been steadily increasing. Id.
at 8, col. 2.
3. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 60; RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 36; see also J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 24-28 (1983) (history of gays in the military); Homosexuals: One Soldier
in 25?, 57 NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1961, at 92, 94.
4. See C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 60.
5. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (the Constitution rebels
at the thought of going into men's minds); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966)
(privacy in fundamental choices is a basic civil right); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy).
6. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83. See also infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to choose a marital
partner free of state racial restrictions).
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Military regulations excluding homosexuals impinge upon constitutional rights in three major areas: freedom of association or
the right to be homosexual, 9 personal autonomy or the right to participate in private consensual sex,10 and the right to be let alone. I x
In promulgating overly restrictive regulations, the military has erroneously concluded that its goals are anathema to participation by
homosexuals. 12 The military points to the mere potential for
problems relating to morale, 13 recruitment,' 4 suggestions of impartiality,1 5 and threats to national security as the rationale for drafting its overly restrictive regulations.' 6 These concerns, however,
are misplaced and do not consider the outstanding contributions
that undiscovered homosexuals have been making to the military
7
over many years.'
The means currently employed in discovering and discharging
homosexuals from the military is over-inclusive' 8 and invades constitutional privacy rights. 19 The military should narrow the scope
of its regulations, and discharge only those people whose sexuality
9. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1960), the Supreme Court
noted that freedom of association was a peripheral first amendment right. As a
peripheral right, the freedom of association is intrinsic to the appreciation of
other explicitly mentioned first amendment rights. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83
(citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1960)). The Court has noted that
"[w]ithout ... peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure." Id.
See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1958) (the peripheral
rights made it impermissible to bar a lawyer from practice simply because he
had once been a member of the Communist party). In the military context, this
peripheral right should be invoked in cases where the military discharges
homosexuals for status alone, absent a showing of any homosexual acts. See
benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980). For a
discussion of this case see infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
10. Although the Supreme Court has not formally acknowledged the right,
the language of early privacy decisions suggest that such a right exists. See infra notes 141-70 and accompanying text.
11. See Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) (the right to be let alone lies at the very base of all privacy rights); see
also infra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 25.
13. Cf. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court found
homosexuality in the military detrimental to morale and discipline).
14. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying note 71.
16. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 182 (1st Cir. 1985) (before
Sergeant Matthews was honorably discharged after four years as a field communications equipment mechanic, she received high performance ratings and
numerous awards).
18. See generally Miller v. Rumsfeld, 632 F.2d 788, reh'g denied, 647 F.2d 80,
86-89 (9th Cir. 1981) (Boochever, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
19. Miller, 647 F.2d at 85-86 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (even socially condemned activities are protected from infringement when carried out in private).
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prevents them from completing their duties in a responsible manner. 20 Absent any nexus between work performance and sexuality,
the constitutional rights of homosexuals are being consistently violated by systematic discharges from military service. 21 With the
adoption of a more rational, less exclusionary policy toward homoitself and conform to the consexuals, the military will strengthen
22
stitutional concern for privacy.
UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY TOWARD HOMOSEXUALS

The History

Homosexuals have been systematically discriminated against in
the United States Armed Forces more than in any other area of
employment in the last three decades. 23 Such discrimination occurs
because the military system fosters strict discipline and conformity;24 homosexuals do not seem to fit in. 25 As one spokesperson for
20. Id. at 89 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(less restrictive policies should be considered by the military).
21. See, e.g., benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (discharge should not be allowed absent a "nexus" between
sexuality and military performance).
22. For a discussion of some less restrictive alternatives to current military
policy see Miller, 647 F.2d at 89-90 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
23. See Rivera, Our Straight Laced Judges: The Legal Positionof Homosexual PersonsIn the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 837 (1979).
24. It has been said that "[w]hen a person enters the Armed Forces of the
United States, he leaves one society for another." Finn, The Two Societies, in
CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 3 (J. Finn. ed. 1971). Moreover,
[t]he primary objective of the system of military justice must always be to
maintain discipline within the organization and to ensure prompt compliance with its dictates. With other systems it must be focused more on producing organizational effectiveness than on punishing or protecting
individual action. Unlike the legal systems of the larger society, it must
cope with individuals who are subject to great stress, pressure and responsibility and enforce rules and regulations that have no counterpart in civil
life. Any punishment meted out must be viewed more from its effect on
the organization as a whole than in its effect on the individual. Hence military justice must act as a deterrent to undesirable behavior and an instrument to reinforce organizational standards and command control.
Id. at 5.
Despite well produced misleading commercials assuring recruits that you
can "be all that you can be" in the Army, severe limitations hinder that goal. In
a recent, confidential Army survey, half of the officers who were questioned
agreed that "the bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today's Army."
Halloran, Army Survey Finds Officers Critical,N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, at 1,
col. 3.
25. The Department of Defense recently adopted regulations which uncategorically state that
[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the
military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or
who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission.
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the Defense Department stated, a homosexual's "presence in a military unit would seriously impair discipline, good order, morale and
security. ' 26 Homosexuals, therefore, have been consistently ex27
cluded from the United States Armed Forces.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 194028 led to the immediate registration of more than 16,400,000 males between the
ages of twenty-one and thirty-five. 29 Because the military preferred young, single men with few dependents, a population group
likely to include a disproportionate number of gay men, it employed
psychiatrists to interrogate potential inductees about their sexual
inclinations. 30 The psychiatric screening proved to be relatively ineffective in excluding homosexuals from the military because few
homosexuals were willing to declare themselves as such to avoid
service. 31 Later, during the Vietnam War, many young men at32
tempted to portray homosexual characteristics to evade the draft.
Once the military became aware of such practices, they began to
require medical proof of a draftee's homosexuality.33 In today's volunteer military, medical proof of homosexuality is no longer required because the military relies primarily on self-disclosure.
The investigation and dismissal of homosexuals exacerbated in
the early 1950's as the result of a Senate committee investigation
into the employment of "homosexuals and other sex perverts" 34 in
government. This investigation led to a Defense Department direcThe presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the military
services to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual
trust and confidence among service members; to insure the integrity of the
system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of service members who frequently must live and work under
close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members
of the military services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security.
32 C.F.R. § 41.13 (1984). These new regulations repeat nearly verbatim the Defense Department policy enunciated in January, 1981. 32 C.F.R. § 41.13 (1981).
26. L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
27. Army regulations and Department of Defense directives provide that a
finding of homosexuality in any service member requires immediate separation
from military service. Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing relevant regulations).
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-71 (App. 1982).
29. J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 24 (1983).
30. Id. See also W. MENNINGER, PSYCHIATRY IN A TROUBLED WORLD 221-31
(1948) (tracing the history of homosexuality and psychiatric screening in the
military).
31. See J. D'EMILIO, supra note 29, at 24. The screening may have failed
due to the patriotic fervor sweeping the country combined with the stigma attached to a rejection for neuropsychiatric reasons. Id.
32. See R. JOHNSON, DON'T SIT IN THE DRAFr 160-61 (1980) (a draft counseling guide describing the extreme lengths sought in evading military service).
33. Id. (requiring past psychiatric or medical records).
34. J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES (1983). For a further discussion of the homosexual "witch hunts" of the 1950's see id. at 40-44.
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tive to all branches of the armed services which declared that
"known homosexual individuals were military liabilities and security risks who must be eliminated." 35 The directive resulted in the
overly restrictive regulations that have been enforced strictly ever
36
since.
Current Regulations

Two methods, court-martial proceedings and administrative
discharges, are used consistently to "eliminate" homosexuals from
the military. Court-martials are regulated and governed by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 37 Three applicable articles in the
Code may be used to classify homosexual behavior as criminal: article 125 which prohibits sodomy, 38 article 80 which concerns attempted violations of the Code, 39 and article 34 which broadly
prohibits any conduct which may discredit the armed forces. 40 Homosexual behavior will violate any of these articles and subject the
offender to a maximum sentence of five years of hard labor coupled
with either a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, as well as for41
feiture of all pay and veteran's benefits.
There are five types of discharges from the armed services:
42
honorable, general, undesirable, bad-conduct, and dishonorable.
See also Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (1968)
(history of U.S. military attitudes toward homosexuals).

35. SENATE COMM. OF EXPENDITURES IN EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, S. Doc.
No. 241, 81st Cong., 2D SESS., REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND
OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT 3 (1950). The report also stated that sex
perversion weakens the moral fiber of an individual, has a corrosive influence
on other employees, and may spread to the young and impressionable who fall
under the influence of a pervert. Id. at 4. Furthermore, even one "sex pervert
in a government agency" can pollute the office. Id. at 5. For a more complete
discussion of this report see J. D'EMILIo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 42-44 (1983); see also GOVERNMENT VERSUS HOMOSEXUALS (L. Parr ed.
1975) (copy of the report in its entirety).
36. See Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 468
(1969) (author presents an overview of military attitudes).
37. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982).
38. Id. § 925 (unnatural carnal copulation with either the same sex, opposite
sex, or animal is deemed sodomy).
39. Id. § 880 (requires a specific intent to commit any act forbidden by the
Code).
40. Id. § 934 (catch-all section).
41. Id. §§ 856-858A (punishments given in connection with a court-martial).
42. See 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (1984) (detailed description of administrative
separations from the military); see also C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra
note 1, at 52.
Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges can only be given as a result of
court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 59 (1982). The other types of discharge may be given
as a result of a purely administrative process. An honorable discharge is a "separation from the service with honor," 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (1984), and can be
awarded to an enlisted person on the grounds of convenience to the government
or unsuitability. Id. A general discharge is a separation "under honorable con-
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The type of discharge granted can have serious ramifications on the
individual's subsequent civilian life. Because over ninety percent of
all service personnel are granted honorable discharges, 43 an issuance of anything less than an honorable discharge is highly
suspect. 44
Homosexuality or "sexual perversion" is specifically included
as grounds for discharge for unsuitability, 45 unfitness, 46 misconduct, 47 and can be construed as grounds for a separation for the convenience of the government. 48 These current regulations were the
result of special policy statements issued by each service mandating
the removal of homosexual military personnel. 49 These directives
classified homosexual personnel into four separate classes with
each class treated differently. A Class I homosexual is a person
who, while under military jurisdiction, has engaged in a homosexual act involving force, fraud, or coercion of a minor.5 0 A member
of this class of homosexual is usually discharged by means of a
court-martial. 5l The remaining classes are usually granted administrative discharges.5 2 A Class II homosexual is a person who, while
under military jurisdiction, has become involved in, or attempted to
become involved in, or solicited under aggravated conditions, a hoditions issued to an individual ... whose military record is not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an honorable discharge," and can be issued on the grounds
of convenience to the government, unsuitability, unfitness, or misconduct. Id.
43. See C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 38.
44. See generally R. RIVKIN & B. STICHMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 112-18 (1977) (overview of various military discharges).
45. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (1984).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Note, Homosexuals in the Military,37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 468 (1969)
(early historical development of the current regulations). Note that the new
regulations also allow one rarely utilized exception to the general rules of exclusion of homosexuals. According to this exception:
A person may stay in the military, even though he or she has committed, or
attempted to commit, a homosexual act, as long as the following conditions
are met: if the act was a 'departure from the member's usual and customary
behavior,' or was done without 'force, coercion, or intimidation,' and is 'unlikely to recur,' if the member 'does not desire to engage in [further] homosexuals acts,' and if 'the member's continued presence in the Service is
deemed consistent with the interest of the Service in proper discipline,
good order and morale.'
32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (eff. 1984).
50. Note, Homosexuals in the Military,37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 468 (1969).
For the regulations promulgated by the various service branches implementing
the new Defense Department regulations excluding homosexuals, see Army
Regulations AR635-100, 635-212; Air Force Manual, AF Man. 39-12; Secretary of
the Navy Instruction, SECNAV Instruction 199.9c; and Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual §§ 6016-6018.
51. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (1984).
52. Id.
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mosexual act. 53 A Class III homosexual is a person who displays,
claims or admits homosexual tendencies, or who solicits a homosexual act in the absence of aggravated circumstances. 54 Lastly, a Class
IV homosexual is a person who participated in homosexual behavior before entering the military or one who failed to admit his or
her homosexuality at the time of entry and thus joined the armed
55
services fraudulently.
While apparently based on discernible degrees of aggravation,
these regulatory distinctions are seriously flawed. For example, the
term "aggravated conditions" under Class II is vague and may duplicate the "force, fraud and coercion" condition mentioned in Class
I. Because the lines are not clearly drawn, it is hard to be sure what
circumstances would be deemed "aggravated" only for Class II purposes and yet not quite sufficient for Class I designation.56
Although the differences between Classes I and II are vaguely distinguishable, Class III can clearly encompass Class IV because "aggravated circumstances" must be absent from each. 57 By
categorizing homosexuals into these four classes, the military rules
imply that homosexuality is criminal, recognizing different degrees
of criminality based upon the extent of the homosexual's sexual activity.58 This approach is problematic because homosexuality, like
heterosexuality, is not a state of being that exists in different degrees.5 9 Furthermore, the homosexual behavior required for Class
I, and possibly Class II, need not be classified because it is already
53. Id
54. Id.
55. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (1984) (fradulent entry into military service).
Administrative dismissal is most often used to discharge Classes II through
IV. Id. Most of those discharged under these classes receive general discharges;
however, some will receive undesirable or honorable discharges as well. Id. Officers, who must be court-martialed in order to be discharged, are generally
given the opportunity "to resign 'for the good of the service'" in order to avoid
trial. C. WILLIAM & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 28 (1971).
56. Specifically, it would appear that force, fraud, and coercion would all be
aggravated circumstances.
57. Because presumably all of the Class III and Class IV homosexual acts
occur in private, it should be immaterial to distinguish whether these acts occur
prior to, or during military service.
58. There is nothing criminal about homosexuality per se. See, e.g., People
v. Giani, 154 Cal. App. 2d 539, 302 P.2d 813 (1956) (court held that there is no
basis for the assumption that homosexuals are predisposed to commit prohibited acts). Criminality based upon status alone has been held unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661 (1962) (narcotic addiction as a
criminal act would constitute cruel and unusual punishment). For a more complete discussion of the Robinson case, see infa text accompanying notes 117-21.
59. It has been well documented that sexual orientation is not a matter of
"choice." See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1129-32 (N.D. Tex. 1982),
appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Comment, Burdens On
Gay Litigantsand Bias in the CourtSystem: Homosexual Panic,Child Custody,
and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 497, 527 n.118 (1984)
(authorities cited for the proposition that sexual orientation is not a matter of
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encompassed within the definition of rape.6 0 Therefore, the separate military rules relating to Class I and Class II homosexuals are
unnecessary and redundant. Further, the other classes are similarily unfounded because the regulations do not adequately serve
6
the military's purposes. '
Purposesfor the Military Regulations
Many of the arguments for anti-homosexual legislation in civil62
ian life have been applied even more strenuously to military life.
Proponents of anti-homosexual legislation contend that homosexual behavior is a menace to the health of society, has a detrimental
effect on the family, and that if not punished, will eventually turn
63
consensual offenders into child molesters.
The Defense Department recently adopted regulations pronouncing the purposes for the military's exclusion of homosexuals. 64 Among the interests homosexuals purportedly impinge are:
the maintenance of discipline, good order, and morale; the establishment of mutual trust and confidence among service members;
the integrity of the system of rank and command; the recruitment
of members; the public image of the military; and the prevention of
breaches of security.6 5 Federal courts have taken these interests
into account in construing the validity of the armed services' exclusionary rules pertaining to homosexuals. The federal courts are divided on the issue depending upon the particular court's view of the
constitutional right to private consensual sex.66 Courts that have
choice); see generally W. MASTERS & W. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE (1979) (authors discuss fully the psychological aspects of homosexuality).
60. Regarless of the sex of the victim, the Class I description of acts "involving force, fraud or coercion of a minor" would be considered statutory rape. See,
e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1983). Similarly, Class II involves aggravated
conduct which may be considered assault, battery, or attempted rape regardless
of the victim's gender. Id.; see also id. § 8-4 (rules governing attempt offenses).
61. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
62. Compare Note, The Constitutionality of Laws ForbiddingPrivate Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1629-32 (1974) (summarizes civilian
arguments for anti-homosexual legislation) with RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE, supra
note 1 (military arguments for excluding homosexuals).
63. Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual
Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1631 (1974).
64. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.13 (1984).
65. Id. See supra note 25.
66. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upheld military regulations since the Supreme Court has
not recognized a constitutional right to participate in private consensual sex
with a member of the same sex); benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F.
Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Army regulations found unconstitutional as relating
to freedom to associate with homosexuals and freedom to be homosexual). See
generally Comment, Homosexual Conduct in the Military: No Faggots in Military Woodpiles, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 79 (overview of inconsistencies existing in
legal treatment of military policies). The term 'faggot,' meaning a bundle of
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upheld the military regulations have identified such interests as
protecting the fabric of military life, preserving the integrity of the
recruiting process, and reconciling parental concerns about their
67
children associating with homosexuals.
One recent case illustrated possible dangers that the military
must consider. In Dronenburg v. Zech,68 a 27-year old petty officer
had repeated sexual relations with a 19-year old seaman recruit
before the latter chose to end the relationship. 69 The Dronenburg
court expressed concern that a situation like Petty Officer
Dronenburg's would be detrimental to morale and discipline. 70
Moreover, the Dronenburg court stated that the situation would
call into question the even-handedness of officers' dealings with
lower ranks, spur dislike and disapproval among those who find homosexuality morally offensive, and, given the authority of military
superiors, raise the possibility of homosexual seduction. 71 While
many of these concerns may be legitimate, none were supported
with any substantiated facts in this instance.7 2 The Dronenburg
court, in fact, concluded that the alleged problems were so obvious
that no sociological tests were needed to substantiate the purposes
73
behind the military rules.
The military's contentions, however, have been criticized for
several reasons. 74 First, the hostility toward homosexuals does not
justify excluding them because similar hostilities toward blacks or
sticks, acquired its pejorative connotation when homosexuals were burned at
the stake in the Middle Ages. Id. at 79.
67. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir. 1980). But see
Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1981) (Boochever, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (dissenting opinion provides a complete discussion
and criticism of the Beller opinion).
68. 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
69. Dronenburg,741 F.2d at 1398.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The Dronenburgcourt addressed a number of possible problems without substantiating any of them. Id. at 1398.
73. In Dronenburg,the court stated that "the Navy is not required to produce social science data or the results of controlled experiments to prove what
common sense and common experience demonstrates." Id. Significantly, the
court equivocates before the prior statement in noting that the "effects of homosexual conduct within a naval or military unit are almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline." Id. (emphasis added).
The Dronenburg court based its decision on a rational basis test. Id. Because the court invoked only minimal scrutiny, it considered the military rules
rational and therefore failed to recognize a constitutional right to be homosexual. Id.
74. See Miller, 647 F.2d at 88-89. The first criticism of the Beller justifications is that the Navy should not be and is not in the business of promoting
morality. Id. The Supreme Court has noted that "the primary business of...
navies [is] to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise." Id. (citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)). Although the Navy may insist on
discipline in the service, the maintenance of such discipline does not justify reg-
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women would not justify their exclusion.7 5 Second, the military itself is promulgating a lack of respect for homosexuals by treating
them as second-class citizens. 76 Third, the emotional relationship is
not a valid concern as there is no correlating rule relating to emotional heterosexual relationships. 77 Finally, parents' concerns are
not a legitimate consideration because almost all recruits have
reached the age of majority.78 Even if parents' concerns are to be
considered, parents cannot shelter their children from homosexuality because homosexuals participate in all walks of life.7 9
Besides social considerations, an additional military concern acknowledged in a number of cases is the threat to national security
arising out of homosexuals who hold high security clearances.80
ulation of the private lives of Navy members. Id. "Intolerance is not a constitutional basis for an infringement of fundamental personal rights." Id.
Moreover, many of the Navy's concerns are not indigenous to homosexuals.
Id. Regarding any other conduct or personal traits, the Navy has an elaborate
system for case-by-case determination of fitness, however, the Navy refuses to
tailor such an approach to homosexuality. Id.
75. See Miller, 647 F.2d at 88-89.
The Navy could assert identical fears as a basis for the blanket discharge or
rejection of groups other than homosexuals, and the unconstitutionality
would be unquestioned. The Navy recently has witnessed 'tensions and
hostility' between members of various racial groups, many of whom may
'detest' and 'despise' other races. Yet, obviously the Navy could not constitutionally bar all blacks from service, regardless of whether the majority of
Navy personnel despise them. Similarly, emotional relationships maysurely do-occur between male and female Navy personnel. Yet the Navy
obviously may not bar all women from service simply because some emotional relationships might negatively affect proper command relationships.
The same can be observed of the Navy's fear of the inability of some personnel to gain the respect and trust of those they command. This problem
could--and no doubt does, in some instances--arise because the commander is black or a woman. Yet the Navy obviously could not constitutionally bar all blacks or all women even if they were not respected by the
majority of Navy personnel.
Id.
76. Id. at 87-88.
77. Id. at 88-89.
78. The military requires that recruits be over 18 years of age. 10 U.S.C.
§ 505(A) (1982). In rare instances, a seventeen year old can be admitted with
parental consent. Id.
79. The Miller dissent was adamant in rejecting parental concerns. Chief
Judge Boochever wrote:
(H]omosexuals participate in all walks of life. They are in Boy and Girl
Scouts, on high school facilities and athletic teams, and in church groups;
they work in factories, stores, restaurants and offices. In short, parents can
shield their children from incidential association with homosexuals only by
shielding them from the world.
Miller, 647 F.2d at 89 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
80. See Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (homosexual
activity may be considered in determining the issuance of a security clearance);
Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (homosexuality
was a legitimate concern in granting a security clearance). But see Wentworth

1985]

Homosexuals In The Military

The fear is that homosexuals, as opposed to heterosexuals, are easily subject to coercion, influence, or pressure due to the threat of
blackmail.8 1 Ironically, the military regulations themselves create
an atmosphere that increases the threat of blackmail because if the
regulations did not proscribe homosexuality, the threat of black82
mail would not exist.
Despite the military's concerns regarding homosexuals,8 3 the
problem appears to be somewhat self-inflicted.8 4 Even during the
height of the military screening process, Doctor William Menninger 8 5 alleged that "for every homosexual who was [excluded
from the military service] ....
there were five or ten who never
were detected. '8 6 Because most of those healthy, young, all-american homosexuals admirably served their country without destroying the fiber of military life, the current concerns over admitting
homosexuals to the military are absurd.8 7 The exclusion of homosexuals based on the mere possibility of problems is especially untenable when the loss of time, effort, money, and good military
88
personnel are taken into account.
Aside from the fact that the military regulations are absurd,
they should also be ruled unconstitutional because homosexual
soldiers should have the right to be homosexual without fear of military discharge.8 9 Moreover, the homosexual soldier's constituv. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.C. 1972) (admitted homosexuality was insufficient reason to justify withdrawal of security clearance absent other evidence
of unreliability). See generally Rivera, supra note 23, at 829-37 (overview of
homosexual relations and security clearances).
81. See Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d at 746, 748.
82. By excluding homosexuals from the military and compelling the discharge of known homosexuals, the military has promulgated the possibility of
blackmail.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
84. Because many of the personnel being discharged under the military regulations have exemplary prior records, these soldiers would have undoubtedly
continued to serve admirably absent the unbending military rules. C. WILLIAMS
& M. WEINBERG,

supra note 1, at 60.

85. Doctor William Menninger is a noted psychiatrist and the author of
PSYCHIATRY IN A TROUBLED WORLD (1948).

86. J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 25 (1983). See
also id. at n.4 (other sources for military estimates of homosexuals serving in
the military).
87. See supra note 3.
88. "The four branches of the armed services-Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines-spent $22.5 million recruiting and training the nearly 1,800 gay and
lesbian service members who were ousted during fiscal year 1983 because of
their sexual orientation. Another $370,000 was spent to process their military
discharges." Kulieke, Military Spends Millions to Exclude Gays, The Advoc.,
Nov. 27, 1984, at 8, col. 1.
89. See infra notes 11140 and accompanying text; see also supra note 9. See
generally Soloman, The Emergence of Associational Rights for Homosexual
Persons, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAw 147-55 (D. Knutson ed. 1980) (general discussion of homosexuals' right to free association).
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tional right to privacy is being infringed because homosexuals have
an implicit right to participate in private consensual sexual activities 9° and to keep their sexuality private. 91
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE HOMOSEXUAL SOLIDER
The Origins of Privacy Law

The right to privacy is a freedom fundamental to the American
way of life.92 The notion of a right to privacy is implicit in the fourteenth amendment's consideration of due process. 93 This right to
privacy can also be found in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 94 Moreover, implicit in the first amendment are the
90. See supra note 10. See also Note, The Right of Privacy:A Renewed Challenge to Laws RegulatingPrivate ConsensualBehavior, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 106784 (1979). See generally Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 957-1018 (1979).
91. See supra note 11.
92. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (the constitution rebels at the
thought of governmental intrusion into men's minds); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1966) (privacy in fundamental choices is a basic civil right of man); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (liberty
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people so as to be fundamental); Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See
generally Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253-71 (1966) (overview of the history of privacy); Bloustein, The
First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41-49 (1974) (history of the first amendment as it
relates to privacy); Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A PhilosophicalPrelude,31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272-306 (1966) (the philosophy of the right to privacy);
Nizer, The Right to Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526-60 (1941) (right to be let alone
as a "natural right"); Comment, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope
and Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499-528 (1952) (privacy as a staple of
democracy).
93. The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
Privacy is implicit here because it is encompassed by the concepts of life
and liberty, and the privileges and immunities of citizenship which include the
right to be left alone. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
94. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "no person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

The Bill of Rights, and in particular, the due process clause, was established
to protect those liberties that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1935). The determination of which rights are fundamental demands an
inquiry as to whether the right involved "is of such a character that it cannot be
denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'.
Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
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freedoms of association and expression which also relate to privacy
95
rights.
In 1965, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged an independent constitutional right to privacy. 6 In Griswold v. Connecticut,97 the Court noted that "peripheral" rights existed, which
although not explicitly found in the Constitution, were nevertheless paramount to the appreciation of those rights which were specifically mentioned. 98 Since then, the constitutional right to privacy
95. See supra note 9. Substantive due process was propounded by the dis-

senters in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The majority, however, felt that due process should be limited in its scope. Id. at 39.
Gradually, the Slaughter-House dissenters' view became the majority view,
leading to a broader interpretation of the due process clause. Although the use
of substantive due process to protect economic rights has been discredited, substantive due process has flourished once again as a haven for fundamental values relating to the protection of privacy and autonomy. See, e.g., Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964) (freedom of the entire university community to
be devoid of governmental intervention); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1960) (freedom to associate and keep membership lists private); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (freedom to teach); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right to educate one's child as one chooses); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (the right to reach a foreign language).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Prickett, The Right
of Privacy: A Black View of Griswold v. Connecticut, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
777 (1980).
97. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98. Id. at 482-83. The Court noted that "[w]ithout those peripheral rights
the specific rights would be less secure," and would lose their force. Id. For
example, the Court recognized that the right to freedom of speech includes not
only the right to print or utter, but the right to read, distribute, and receive as
well. Id. at 482 (citing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)). Finally,
the Court concluded that the first amendment contains a penumbra where privacy is protected from government intervention. Id. at 483.
The narrow issue in Griswold concerned the constitutionality of a state
statute which forbade the use of contraceptives. Id. at 480-81. The Court found
that the statute violated the right to marital privacy contained within the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 485. The Court reaffirmed the principle
that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Id. (citing
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1960)). The Griswold Court considered
the State's entry into the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms "repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." 381 U.S. at 486.
Thus, the right of marital privacy was the first privacy right expressly found to
be within the penumbras of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Justice
Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and initimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior discussion.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:937

has been expanded and developed in a number of cases. 99 Yet, despite a wealth of privacy cases, the outer limits of the right to privacy have not been marked.10 0
The right to privacy has received great attention in recent years
in the area of abortion rights.'0 1 In Roe v. Wade,10 2 the Court found
that the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy. 10 3 The Court held, however, that a woman's right to an
abortion is not absolute 0 4 and must be considered against important state interests. 0 5 The state interests, however, must be compelling in order to warrant regulations limiting privacy rights. 0 6
Furthermore, any legislative enactments limiting privacy rights
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. 10 7 Foremost among the major privacy rights are:
99. See, e.g., Carey v. Populations Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (minor's
right to contraceptives recognized); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's
right to obtain an abortion upheld); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognized the fundamental right to decide whether to beget a child); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry outside of one's race acknowledged).
100. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Carey, the Court
held unconstitutional a statute forbidding the display or sale to minors of nonprescription contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 700. This was an important decision
because it recognized a legitimate privacy interest outside the environs of the
marital relationship. See Adamany, The Supreme Court At the Frontierof Politics: The Issue of Gay Rights, 1980 HAMLINE L. REV. 185, 204-05 (privacy rights
of homosexuals and individual autonomy). This decision actually extends the
notion of personal autonomy introduced by Justice Douglas in his opinion in
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Moreover,
the Court found that the state interest in limiting the sexual activity of minors
was not legitimately served by restricting minors' access to contraceptives. Carey, 431 U.S. at 690-91, 695-96. The Carey Court acknowledged that limiting
access to contraceptives will probably not substantially discourage early sexual
behavior. Id. at 695. Furthermore, the "moral" concerns of the state were not
sufficiently shown to meet the compelling state interest test. Id. at 690.
101. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (minors' right to abortion
without parental consent); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(invalidated restrictions on the distribution and advertising of nonprescription
contraceptives); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(abortions allowed with parents' or husband's consent); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) (abortions could not be restricted to state residents); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (established a woman's right to obtain an abortion).
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. Id. at 153.
104. Id. at 154.
105. Id. The legitimate state interests the Court noted included safeguarding
health, the maintenance of medical standards, and the protection of potential
life. Id.
106. Id. The Court noted that "[alt some point in pregnancy, these respective
interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that
govern the abortion decision." Id. While refusing to determine at what point
life begins, the Court set the "compelling" point at the end of the first trimester. Id. at 163.
107. Id. at 155 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). The interests at stake were
outlined by Justice Douglas in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Doug-
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(1) freedom of association;10 8 (2) personal autonomy; 10 9 and
(3) freedom from intrusion or the "right to be let alone." 110 Moreover, each of these areas lend added support for the homosexual
soldier's right to privacy.
Freedom of Association-The Right to Be Homosexual

In Griswold, the Court acknowledged the right of marital privacy along with the broader peripheral first amendment rights of
freedom to associate and privacy in that association."' The Court
reaffirmed the right to marry and freedom of choice in the marital
scheme in Loving v. Virginia."2 In Loving, the Court struck Virginia's antimiscegenation statute as unconstitutional." 3 The Court
noted that the freedom to marry the partner of one's own choosing
1 14
is a vital personal right essential to the pursuit of happiness.
Although Loving dealt strictly with racial barriers to marriage,
some of the Court's language suggests that the choice of an adult
marital partner would be beyond state intervention on any
grounds." 5 Logically, this would include the right to choose a holas, J., concurring), the companion case to Roe. The interests included are:

(1) the autonomous control over the cultivation and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality, (2) freedom of choice in the fundamental
decisions of one's life, and (3) freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion. Id.
See Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws ForbiddingPrivate Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613, 1620-25 (1974) (in-depth discussion of privacy interests and homosexuality). A majority of the Court has never formally adopted
these interests; however, many of the concerns Justice Douglas expressed have
been referred to in lower court decisions concerning privacy. See, e.g., benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. at 975. See generally Richards,
Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in
Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979)
(overview of the right to sexual autonomy).
108. For a discussion of the related homosexual interests involved, see supra
notes 9 & 89. See also infra notes 111-40 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the related homosexual concerns regarding private
consensual sexual activity, see supra note 92. See also infra notes 141-70 and
accompanying text.
110. For a more complete discussion of this privacy interest, see supra note
11.
111. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
113. Id. at 12. See also VA. CODE § 20-59 (1960).
114. 388 U.S. at 12. Further, the Court noted that "[m]arriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id.
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
115. See supra note 114. Because marriage is a fundamental right, one
should have as much right to choose a partner of the same sex as one of a different race. However, no court in the United States has ever acknowledged a constitutional right to marry a partner of the same sex. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (no constitutional sanction or protection
of the right to marry a person of same sex); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (prohibition of same
sex marriage does not violate first, eighth, ninth or fourteenth amendments);
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mosexual marriage partner.
Further support for declaring the military regulations pertaining to homosexual status unconstitutional can be found in Robinson

v. California.i i 7 In Robinson, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state statute making it a crime to be a narcotic addict. n 8 The Court held that it would be "cruel and unusual
punishment" to imprison a person for being an addict by status
alone without the presence of a correlating criminal act." i 9 Moreover, the dissent in Robinson suggested that the majority opinion
stood for the principle that "[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to
change."' 20 Although the homosexual in the military is not being
imprisoned, discharge for status alone amounts to the same sort of
2
punishment which the Court found prohibited in Robinson.' '
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 352 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971) (morning after discovery that "she" was a "he" nullified the marriage);
Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (prohibition of same sex
marriage did not violate the equal protection clause). See generally Annot., 63
A.L.R.3d 1199 (1975) (history of same sex marriages in the United States). Only
one state, however, explicitly requires that marriage applicants be members of
the opposite sex. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01 (Vernon 1974); RIGHTS OF GAY
PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 81.

Although some reformed religious groups have performed gay marriages,
these marriages have no legal significance. They are usually referred to as ceremonies of "holy union" rather than "marriage cermonies." RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 82-83.
The quest for legal recognition of the homosexual family has led some
homosexuals to attempt to adopt their companions. See, e.g., In re Adoption of
Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984) (57-yearold male petitioned to adopt his 50-year-old lover). This tactic for attaining a
legally recognized relationship has been more successful than marriage. Such
adoptions, however, have recently come under increased judicial scrutiny. Id.
(court denied petition for adoption because the relationship between adult parties was incompatible with parent-child relationship). Cf. Moskowitz, Job
Rights for Gays: The Price Tag Gets Higher,Bus. WK., Nov. 26, 1984, at 136 (law
suits being filed against companies for homosexual spouse benefits).
116. If one has the fundamental right to choose a marriagepartner of one's
choice regardless of race and free from governmental intrusion, then surely one
can also choose a marriage partner regardless of that person's sexual
preference.
117. 370 U.S. 661 (1962).
118. Id. at 666-68.
119. Id. at 667. The court noted that narcotic addiction is an illness that can
be acquired innocently or voluntarily. Id. Indeed, a person may be born addicted to narcotics. Id. at 667 n.9.
120. Id. at 682.
121. Homosexuality is not considered to be something that one chooses. See
supra note 59. Therefore, the comparison to narcotic addiction is appropriate.
Moreover, in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court determined that a state has no
right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. 394 U.S. 557, 566
(1969). Thus, "a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Id. at 565. Furthermore, the Court noted that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." Id.
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Lower courts have applied this freedom to associate in justifying the right to homosexual status.122 In benShalom v. Secretary of
the Army, 123 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin declared unconstitutional an Army regulation
124
which compelled the discharge of homosexuals for status alone
125
The benShalom court held
with no evidence of homosexual acts.
that the Army regulation violated both the first amendment 126 and
the constitutional right to privacy. 127 Moreover, the benShalom
court noted that the broad sweep of the Army regulation substanWhile Stanley is restricted to the home, the constitutional right to privacy of
family and marriage is not limited to a particular place but rather to a protected
intimate relationship. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13
(1973). For discussion of the privacy rights of homosexuals, see Adamany,
supra note 100, at 189-220.
122. See, e.g., Gay Lib. v. University of Miss., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977)
(right to form a homosexual group on a student campus recognized); Martinez
v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (freedom to associate with homosexuals upheld). See generally Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizationsand
the Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979) (court recognition of
right to homosexual status); Comment, Free Speech Rights of Homosexual
Teachers, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1980) (association rights of homosexual
teachers explored); Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws ForbiddingPrivate Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974) (discussion of sexual autonomy
rights); Annot., 50 A.L.R. FED. 516 (1980) (list of cases recognizing homosexual
organizations on college campuses). But see Berg v. Clayton, 436 F. Supp. 76
(1977) (freedom of association not impinged by military discharge); Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 66 Misc. 2d 456, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971),
rev'd sub nom. Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 A.D.2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972), affd
sub nom. Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973) (certificate of incorporation for homosexual group denied as
against state's penal code). For an exhaustive survey of the rights of homosexuals in the United States, see Rivera, supra note 23, at 799-955.
123. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980). For a comprehensive discussion of
benShalom see Heilman, The Constitutionality of Discharging Homosexual
Military Personnel, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 191, 196-98 (1980) (constitutional claims and the military regulations excluding homosexuals); Comment,
Employment Discrimination in the Armed Services-An Analysis of Recent
Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Discrimination In The Military, 27
VILL. L. REV. 351, 357-58 (1981) (military regulations and first amendment
infringements).
124. benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 974. See also Heilman, The Constitutionality
of DischargingHomosexual Military Personnel,12 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV.
191, 196-200 (1980-81) (in-depth analysis of homosexual status in the military).
125. benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 973. The Court noted that benShalom did
not engage in any known homosexual activity, nor did she advocate homosexuality to anyone while on duty. Id.
126. Id. at 972-75. The court noted that while the government alleged that
retention of homosexuals will be "detrimental to the 'unique mission' of the
Army," they offered no proof to support that claim. Id. at 973. The court noted
that "[iun the area of First Amendment rights, the government must adopt regulations that are the least intrusive on the individual's liberties." Id. at 974 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973)). In balancing the rights,
the court found the first amendment rights to free association were more important in this case. Id. at 975.
127. Id. at 975-77. The court noted that the military regulations effectively
chilled the free association rights of soldiers. Id. at 975.
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tially impinged the first amendment rights of every soldier to free
association, expression, and speech. 128 Furthermore, the benShalom court considered the "autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and
1 29
personality"'
basic to the first amendment.
In schools, a situation somewhat analogous to the military because of the concern over impressionable minds, the federal courts
have consistently held unconstitutional regulations that discriminate against homosexuals and intrude on the freedom of association. 130 In Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University,131 the
Fifth Circuit held that Texas A&M University could not bar the
existence of a homosexual student group on campus. 132 The court
noted that schools have legitimate interests in prohibiting student
33
activities that are likely to incite violence and disrupt discipline;
however, the court found that the school's fears of promulgating
homosexuality did not amount to a compelling purpose sufficient
enough to allow such a gross intrusion upon first amendment
34
rights.
128. Id. at 976.
129. Id. at 975 (emphasis in original) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
130. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (homosexual school group's
first amendment rights were impinged by the University's denial of official recognition). Cf. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (gay school
group was recognized but denied use of university facilities for a dance). See
generally Rivera, supra note 23, at 924-34 (overview of homosexuality in university situations).
One recent case arose that presented an interesting clash between a university and military recruits. Two law students at Temple University in Philadelphia charged that the school had violated the city's fair practices ordinance
which bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by allowing military recruiters on campus and by helping them arrange interviews. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1985, at 12, col. 6. After careful consideration, Philadelphia's Human
Relations Commission ordered Temple University to stop assisting military
recruiters. Kaplan, Temple RecruitingPracticeRuled in Violation ofAnti-Gay
Bias Law, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 4, col. 4. Under this ruling, the military
may still recruit in the city but cannot be assisted by any entity covered by the
ordinance. Id. This case has been reversed but will be appealed. See Margolick,
Army Wins Case on Recruitment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at 13, col. 1 (district court disregarded first amendment concerns and deferred to the military).
131. 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 1332-33.
133. Id. at 1327. For these interests to be legitimate, however, they cannot be
based on apprehension alone. Id.
134. Id. at 1330. The university argued that the denial of recognition was
justified as an appropriate means of protecting public health. Id. This argument was purely speculative, and as such the court found that it was not determinative. Id. Moreover, the fact that the homosexual student group's
"fraternal" and "social" goals and purposes were not consistent with the philosophy and goals of the school was not in and of itself a valid reason for denying
the group official recognition. Id.
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In another highly publicized case, Fricke v. Lynch, 135 a homosexual student's right to attend the school prom with his date of the
same sex was upheld. 136 Adopting the court's holding in Gay Student Services, the Fricke court found that the "mere desire of avoiding the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint"'137 did not justify prohibiting the particular
expression of opinion at issue in the case. Furthermore, the court
felt that even a legitimate interest in school discipline did not outweigh a student's right to freely express his homosexuality.' 38 Because of the strong similarity of military and school concerns
relating to discipline, morale, and preparation for the real world,
the two settings are analogous.' 3 9 Therefore, if the clear expression
of homosexuality is upheld in the school setting, the denial of free
association with homosexuality in the military setting escapes
140
justification.
PersonalAutonomy-TheRight to ParticipateIn Private
Consensual Sex
Although the Supreme Court has declared private sexual relationships between consenting adults to be within the capacity of
state legislatures, any such legislation must have a compelling purpose. 14 1 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,142 the Court declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute aimed at protecting morals by
135. 491 F. Supp. 381, 388-89. Cassill, A Rhode Island town survives its night
to remember as Aaron takes Paul to the Prom, PEOPLE, June 16, 1980, at 98. See
also A. FRICKE, CONFESSIONS OF A ROCK LOBSTER (1981) (book authored by defendant provided reflections on growing up "gay").
136. Fricke,491 F. Supp. at 388-89.
137. Id. at 386 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969)). In Tinker, the Court noted that high school students do
not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 393 U.S. at 506.
138. Fricke,491 F. Supp. at 387. The free expression of homosexuality, however, should be done peacefully, in an appropriate time, place, and manner. Id.
139. Both the military and the school situations involve preparatory education for life situations.
140. The strict scrutiny applied to students' rights should also be applied to
military personnel. Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, at 12, col. 6 (military discrimination against homosexual students prohibited by Philadelphia Human Relations Commission).
141. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Justice Blackmun stated that
regulations limiting
"[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved ....
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.'" Id. at 155.
See also Adamany, supra note 100, at 268-85.
142. 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
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"regulating the private sexual lives of single persons.' 43 The
Court held that regulations concerning private matters invoke
strict scrutiny1 44 and therefore require a compelling state purpose. 145 The Eisenstadt Court asserted that the individual has the
right to be free from unnecessary governmental intrusions into
matters so vitally affecting a person as the choice of whether to beget children. 146 The Court's language suggests that individuals
have the right to be left alone regarding matters that are basic to
147
human sexuality.
Despite the Court's earlier suggestion in Loving that the choice
of a sexual partner was a fundamental privacy right that could not
be infringed by the state absent a compelling purpose, later Court
decisions are ambiguous on this point. In Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for Richmond,148 the Court summarily affirmed a lower
court decision upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia criminal
statute prohibiting sodomy.' 49 Five years later, however, the Court
denied certiorariin another case which held that the right of privacy did extend to private sexual conduct between consenting
143. Id. at 442. The state suggested that the purpose of the statute was to
promote marital fidelity, as well as to discourage premarital sex. Id. at n.3. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 1971).
Note, however, that under § 21A, contraceptives can be made available to
married persons without regard to whether they are living with their spouses or
to what uses the contraceptives will be put. Thus, the legislation would have no
deterrent effect on extra-marital sexual relations. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 442
n.3.

144. Id. at 452-53.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 453.
147. For a discussion of the right of privacy in the autonomy of one's body
see Adamany, supra note 100, at 202-11.
148. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would
have noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. Moreover,
the summary affirmance did not resolve the issues presented in the case. It has
been noted that a summary affirmance is "not of the same precedential value as
would be an opinion of the Court treating the same question on the merits."
Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). Furthermore, the Court has noted
that the judgment may be affirmed but not necessarily the reasoning by which
it was reached. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975). "An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties and is not to be read as a
renunciation by this Court of doctrine previously announced in our opinion after full argument." Id. at 391-92 (emphasis in original). Finally, a summary
affirmance does not prevent lower courts from coming to an opposite conclusion
except on "the precise issues presented and necessarily determined by those
actions." Illinois State Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
149. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980),
cert.denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). The court relied on the penumbras of the right
to privacy outlined by the Supreme Court in Griswold and the cases that followed it. Id. at 481, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. See Katz, Sexual
Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 ALB. L. REV. 311 (1982);
Recent Cases, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1279
(1981); Note, Right of Privacy-ConsensualSodomy and the Choice of a Moral
Doctrine: New York's Permissive Position, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 75 (1982).
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adults.150 Significantly, the Court's affirmation of Doe did not settle
the question of the constitutionality of private sexual conduct since
the decision can be distinguished in many ways.15s Indeed, prior
decisions of the Court strongly suggest that the right to privacy lies
firmly in the home and in the autonomy of the individual, whether
single or married, to make certain intimate decisions about how to
153
use one's own body.15 2 Doe is inconsistent with these values.
Thus, it has been suggested that since none of the Doe plaintiffs
were threatened with arrest, the Court's disposition can ultimately
54
be explained on the narrow issues of ripeness and standing.
Although these cases touch the periphery of the issue, the Court
has never directly answered the question of whether one has the
155
right to participate in private consensual sex.

150. See State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 210-11, 381 A.2d 333, 340-41 (1971)
(narrow reading of Doe as it does not necessarily represent the reasoning of the
Court). See also Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957
(Doe included no'declaration of constitutionality). Accord Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984)
(six justices have agreed that Doe did not definitively answer the difficult question of whether the right of privacy extends to private sexual conduct between
consenting adults). But see Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Doe constituted a vote on the merits and as such is binding on lower
federal courts). See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4TH 1009 (1983) (cases supporting the validity of statutes making sodomy a criminal offense).
151. For a discussion of the right of privacy in the autonomy of the body see
Adamany, supra note 100, at 202-11.
152. See Adamany, supra note 100, at 218-20 (depreciation of the Doe
decision).
153. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
154. Moreover, in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), decided only a year after Doe, Justice Brennan spoke for four Justices when he
announced in a footnote that "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults." Id. at 694
n.17 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.).
See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring joined by Stewart,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White, J.J.).
155. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. Recently, the Supreme
Court has once again refused to hear a case concerning the issue of homosexual
rights. The Court refused to hear an appeal by a public high school guidance
counselor who lost her job as a result of disclosing to her co-workers that she
was bisexual. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985). See also Greenhouse, Case Is Refused
for Bisexual W7ho Lost Job As Counselor,N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1985, at 10, col. 1.
In an eleven page dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall stated that "homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's population....
[B]ecause of the immediate and severe opprobium often manifested
against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena." Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1985) (Brennan and
Marshall, J.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Furthermore, the Justices
noted that the question of gay rights "raise serious and unsettled constitutional
questions [that] . . . cannot any longer be ignored." Id. at 1379.
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Since Doe, the Court's consistent refusal to hear any cases concerning the right to engage in private sexual activities1 5 6 has resulted in conflicting interpretations of the Doe affirmance in the
federal courts.15 7 A number of federal courts have found state sodomy statutes unconstitutional,1 58 either on equal protection or privacy grounds.' 59 Another group of federal cases have upheld the
constitutionality of state sodomy statutes, 6 0 largely relying on the
ambiguous Doe. Meanwhile, private consensual sexual activity has
been decriminalized in twenty-six states.16 ' The other states rarely
prosecute against private consensual sexual activity even though
many laws against sodomy remain in effect.'6 2 Overall, the trend is
towards the decriminalization of private consensual sex.' 6 3
156. See Adamany, supra note 100, at 202-11.
157. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal
dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas statute discriminated against
homosexuals by prohibiting same-sex sodomy only); People v. Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981) (sodomy posed no threat to the public per se); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J.
200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (right to personal autonomy is fundamental to a free
society). See generally, Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4TH 1009 (1983) (sodomy as a crime
considered).
158. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) (constitutional infringement of fundamental privacy rights).
159. See, e.g., Saunders, 75 N.J. at 212, 381 A.2d at 342-43 (personal autonomy
is fundamental, thereby compelling invalidation of state sodomy statute).
160. See, e.g., State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 413 A.2d 58 (1980) (private unnatural copulation between unmarried adults not found to be encompassed in the
constitutional right to privacy).
161. In twenty-two states, the decriminalization has been accomplished by
either repealing or amending the pertinent criminal statute. RIGHTS OF GAY
PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 109. Those states are: "Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming." Id.
In the other four states, the pertinent criminal statutes have been held unconstitutional when challenged. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) (statute pertaining to consensual sodomy held unconstitutional in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202 (11th Cir. 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.38 (Consol. 1965) (statute pertaining to consensual sodomy held unconstitutional in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101, 3124 (Purdon 1973) (statute which prohibited
voluntary deviate sexual intercourse held unconstitutional in Commonwealth
v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980)); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06
(Vernon 1974) (statute pertaining to any homosexual conduct declared unconstitutional in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984)).
162. Largely, sodomy is not prosecuted because private sexual activities are
rarely, if ever, discovered. More significant, however, is the fact that enforcement of these laws are not a top priority of police forces. See generally RIGHTS
OF GAY PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 108-17 (chapter concerns gays and criminal
law).
163. See generally RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 108-16 (general
overview of current criminal legislation pertaining to homosexuals).
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In Baker v. Wade, 164 a decision of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, the court traced the
Supreme Court's privacy decisions and concluded that the rights of
privacy and personal autonomy do extend to private sexual conduct
between consenting adults, whether heterosexual or homosexual. 165 Because the state had provided no evidence of any state interests compelling enough to justify the impingement of the right to
167
privacy, 166 the state sodomy statute was held unconstitutional.
The court noted, however, that despite the homosexual controversy
168
it would be irrational and unjust to create criminals by statute.
The court relied on Robinson in holding that Texas' sodomy statute
was unconstitutional not only because it infringed constitutional
privacy rights, but also because it created criminality based on sta169
tus alone.
The Supreme Court has gradually developed and expanded the
constitutional right to privacy, stopping short, however, of extending that right to all people regardless of their sexual identity.
The prior decisions of the Court in Loving and Eisenstadt should
lead to the extension of a right to private consensual sex which
would settle the homosexual soldier's dilemma. The Court, however, has declined to hear this issue, choosing to avoid making a
difficult, probably unpopular decision concerning this sensitive
1 70
moral issue.
164. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th
Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 1140. The court found that the implied constitutional protection
of personal autonomy demands that a person be given free choice in their sexual partners. Id.
166. Id. at 1142. The court noted that the state did not produce a single witness, or any other evidence, to support the alleged state interests of "morality
and decency, welfare and safety, and procreation." Id. The one witness who did
testify was not an expert in the field of sexual psychology and his opinions were
not based on sound research. Id. Furthermore, the witness' opinions were contrary to the weight of the evidence regarding current psychiatric views toward
homosexuality. Id.
167. Id. at 1143. In its conclusion, the court addressed the controversiality of
the homosexuality issue in our society. Id. at 1147. The court noted the emotional and controversial nature of this issue in our society, concluding that the
court cannot allow public opinion to impede the granting of constitutional
rights. Id.
168. Id. The court stated that the statute "makes criminals out of more than
700,000 individuals in Texas who are homosexuals, although they did not choose
to be, and who engage in private sexual conduct with other consenting adults."
Id. Furthermore, the court exclaimed that if this statute was not prohibited by
the constitutional right to privacy, then "the state would have the same power
to intrude into the private lives and bedrooms of heterosexuals, and regulate
the intimate sexual relationships of married couples and single males and females." Id.
169. Id. at 1143.
170. The Court has avoided this issue, perhaps, because of fears of a duplication of the troubles that plagued Justice Blackmun after the controversial Roe
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Freedom Against Intrusion-The Right to Be Left Alone

For nearly a century, judges and legal scholars have noted the
importance of the right to be left alone. 17 1 Justice Brandeis considered the right to have certain private matters kept private integral
to man's pursuit of happiness. 172 State courts have adopted this
view primarily in cases involving privacy torts, 173 and the Supreme
Court has also adopted the Brandeis view in a number of constitu174
tional privacy decisions.
In Watkins v. United States,175 the Supreme Court held that
Congress has no power to expose, for the sake of exposure, private
matters when the result can only be an invasion of an individual's
privacy rights. Furthermore, although every "reasonable indulgence of legality"'176 must be afforded to actions of a branch of govv. Wade decision. In a recent New York Times article, it was reported that
Justice Blackmun has received numerous death threats, piles of hate mail and
has needed virtually perpetual security protection since then. A Candid talk
with JusticeBlackmun, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 20, 1983, at 20. This reality
may have kept the Court from opting to decide other controversial morality
issues such as homosexuality. See the discussion of the Rowland case, supra
note 155. See also Board of Education v. National Gay Task Force, 53 U.S.L.W.
4408 (Mar. 26, 1985) (dead-locked Court ruling without written opinion upheld
lower court decision that Oklahoma could not constitutionally dismiss public
school teachers for speaking out in favor of homosexual rights). The vote was 4
to 4, with Justice Powell not participating and with the positions of the eight
voting Justices not identified. Greenhouse, Vote Upholds Teachers on Homosexual Rights, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at 9, col. 1. The press noted that this case
represented the second time in a year that the court failed to issue a definitive
opinion in a case concerning homosexual rights even after arguments were
heard. Id. at col. 2. The other case was New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332
(1984). The Uplinger case concerned a New York law which made it a crime to
loiter in a public place for the purpose of a homosexual solicitation. Id. The
court initially heard arguments in the Uplinger case but later decided that the
review was improvidently granted in a 5-to-4 vote. Greenhouse, Vote Upholds
Teachers on Homosexual Rights, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at 9, col. 2.
171. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (right to be left
alone acknowledged by the Court); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (right to be let alone noted as fundamental to
the pursuit of happiness). See also Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). For a full discussion of the right to privacy, see Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 233-46 (1977).
172. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890). In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), Justice Brandeis noted the "significance of man's
spiritual nature," concluding that the right to be let alone is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173. For a general discussion of the privacy torts see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
174. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (right to be free from
governmental intrusion); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (government committee inquiry held overbroad and unduly intrusive on individual privacy interests).
175. 354 U.S. 178, 205-06 (1957).
176. Id. at 187.
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ernment, such deference cannot yield to an "unnecessary and
'177
unreasonable dissipation of precious constitutional freedoms.
Thus, there are limits to governmental intrusion into personal matters. Courts must strictly scrutinize private matters that will un178
dermine an individual's right to be let alone.
The Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe,'179 acknowledged a
state's right to keep a copy of every individual's prescription for certain drugs, so long as the data was securely kept and only put to
limited use.' 80 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that the limited use of the prescription drug information was
not an invasion of privacy, but broad dissemination of such information would intrude on constitutionally protected privacy rights and
would be justified only by compelling state interests.181 Accordingly, compelling interests should also be required when the government extensively inquires into private matters at the expense of
the individual's right to be let alone. Although minor inquiries into
an employee's homosexuality have been upheld in the area of government security, there is no justification for extensive
82
investigation.'
In Gayer v. Schlesinger,1 83 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia determined that homosexuality may be
considered when granting security clearances.'84 The Court emphasized, however, that a homosexual could not be required to respond to questions concerning intimate details of his sex life. 8 5
Allowing the government to ask only limited questions effectively
balances the government's interests with the right to privacy. Un8 6
fortunately, the courts have not been consistent in this matter,1
and some courts have even tolerated extensive interrogation into a
177. Id. at 204.

178. Id. at 197-200. See generally Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.
U.L. REV. 216-26 (1960) (overview of government intrusion as it effects the right
to be let alone).
179. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
180. Id. at 602 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court noted that "some individual's concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone
needed medical attention;" however, "[riequiring such disclosures to representatives of the state having responsibility for the health of the community, does
not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy." Id.
181. Id. at 606. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
182. See generally RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 49-57 (chapter
dealing with homosexuals and security clearances).
183. 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
184. Id. at 748.
185. Id. at 752. The court noted that while the government may question
prospective holders of security clearances as to their sexuality, "the identity of
sex partners is not to be insisted upon, unless in a particular case some special
reason can be held to justify it." Id.
186. Only one year later, in Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) questions seeking descriptions of homosexual acts, and a list of places
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homosexual's private life.187 Homosexuals, therefore, are being singled out for an in-depth investigation into their private lives that
would rarely be tolerated if done to any other group. The interest
in national security can and should be achieved without unduly infringing the constitutional privacy rights of any man or woman, regardless of their sexuality. The right to be let alone commands
nothing less.
UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY TOWARD HOMOSEXUALS AS AN
INFRINGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS

In the past, the justifications for excluding homosexuals from
the military may have been more justifiable because homosexuality
was considered a psychological disorder.1 88 The attitude toward
homosexuals, however, has progressed immensely during the past
twenty years.18 9 In fact, the Board of Trustees of the American
Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its official list
of mental diseases in 1973.190 In maintaining its inflexible treatment toward homosexuals, the military has failed to recognize contemporary social and medical attitudes in its regulations.
An increasing number of legal cases challenging military discharges for homosexuality have arisen during recent years because
more homosexuals are questioning the legality of excluding homosexuals from the military rather than passively allowing their
rights to be violated. 19 1 As previously indicated, the military reguwhere the acts occurred, were held not to be a unconstitutional intrusion of the
right of privacy. Id. at 1377-78.
187. Id. A recent article reported an incident illuminating the military's
egregious disregard for a homosexual's privacy. Boffey, Of AIDS and the Lack
of Confidentiality, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1985, at 8, col. 3. The article reported
that Navy doctors betrayed a homosexual AIDS patient by reporting him for
discharge despite assurances that all inquiries into his sex life would remain
confidential. Id.
188. See R. BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY 3 (1981).
189. See Comment, Homosexual Conduct in the Military: No Faggots in Military Woodpiles, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 79, 111-12 (military out of synch with
changing societal views toward homosexuality). See generally J. KATZ, GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY (1976) (a documentary of lesbians and gay men in
America); J. KATz, GAY/LESBIAN ALMANAC (1983) (supplement to Gay American History). Cf. Robter, New York Officials Back School Serving Homosexual
Youths, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1985, at 1, col. 3 (New York City established school
for homosexuals).
190. See supra note 188.
191. See Kulieke, supra note 1, at col. 3. See also Murphy, The Soldier's
Right to a Private Life, 24 MIL. L. REv. 97-124 (1964). Generally, one does not
surrender his or her constitutional rights upon entering the military. Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally R. RIVKIN & B.
STICHMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (1977) (An American Civil
Liberties Union Handbook). Those constitutional rights, however, must be
viewed in light of the special circumstances and needs which might infringe
constitutional rights in other contexts but might survive scrutiny due to mili-
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lations requiring discharges of persons who are homosexuals in status alone, without any evidence of participation in homosexual acts
while in the service, have been declared overbroad and violative of
first amendment freedoms. 192 Courts have recognized that homosexual status has no more relevance to military skills than do gender or skin color;193 in fact, homosexual status has absolutely no
relevance to military job performance.19 4 Finally, courts have
noted the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable nature of the
Army's conclusion that homosexual status alone makes an individual "unsuitable" for military service. 195 Many homosexual soldiers'
service records are exemplary; absolutely no nexus exists between
status as a homosexual and suitability for service. 19 Unfortunately, because the Supreme Court has yet to recognize that there is
a right to be homosexual, 197 there is no consistency in the lower

courts. 198 Thus, various degrees of scrutiny have been applied to
tary necessities. Id. See also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975)
(military service requires special discipline without counterpart in civilian life);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (military, by necessity, is a separate
society).
192. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977 (E.D. Wis.
1980). See also supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
193. benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 974.
194. See, e.g.,
benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 977. The court noted that
[i]n this instance, not only was the petitioner discharged in violation of her
first amendment and privacy rights, she was also discharged as 'unsuitable'
for service simply due to her status as a homosexual. The record is very
clear that, despite her homosexuality, she was a 'suitable' soldier in every
respect. It is reasonable to conclude from the extensive record that her
performance as a soldier was not only 'suitable' it was indeed exemplary.
There is absolutely no 'nexus' between her status as a homosexual and her
suitability for service.
Id. The court found that benShalom neither engaged in any known homosexual activity nor did she advocate homosexuality to anyone while on duty. Id. at
973. Moreover, "[h]er homosexuality caused no disturbances except in the
minds of those who chose to prosecute her." Id. See also E. GIBSON, GET OFF MY
SHIP (1978) (the story of a lesbian's separation from the Navy).
195. Id. at 976-77.
196. Id. at 977. See also Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(due process compels the court to forbid arbitrary and capricious dismissals).
Accord Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (arbitrary and
capricious dismissals are inconsistent with due process).
197. See Adamany, supra note 100, at 202-11.
198. Id.
Only a year after the Army's discharge of benShalom for homosexual status was held unconstitutional, another homosexual status discharge was upheld
in Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 516 F. Supp. 621 (Colo. 1981), affd, 735 F.2d
1220 (10th Cir. 1984). Rich was discharged for fraudulent enlistment based on
his "false" representation during the enlistment process that he was not homosexual. Id. at 1223. It was directed that Rich should be honorably discharged
under Chapter 14, which permits discharge for fraudulent entry into the Army.
Id. Fraudulent entry "is defined as the procurement of entry through any deliberate material misrepresentation, omission, or concealment which if known,
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the military regulations. 199

For example, in Beller v. Middendorf,20 0 the Ninth Circuit apparently applied intermediate scrutiny in upholding military regulations excluding homosexuals. 20 1 The court, however, in applying
intermediate scrutiny, failed to establish any nexus between the
regulations and the job performance of the soldiers. 20 2 Thus, even
with an intermediate scrutiny test, the broad sweep of the military
regulations exceed the legitimate concerns of the military regarding
homosexuals absent a specific showing of job impairment.2 0 3 Instead, strict scrutiny should be applied because fundamental consti20 4
tutionally protected privacy rights are being infringed.
Outside of the military context, federal courts have held that
there must be a valid connection between a person's sexual activities and the quality of his or her work performance to justify firing
the employee. 20 5 Generally, the only cases which have upheld the
dismissal of homosexual government employees concerned employmight have resulted in rejection." Id. (citing Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 14, § 14-5
(1973)).
Rich maintained that his sexual identity was not determined until after his
enlistment, however, some of his earlier admissions were inconsistent with that
contention. Id. The court was irrational in holding that Rich's first amendment
rights were not violated since he was not discharged for advocating homosexuality or associating with homosexuals but rather for "being one." Id. at 1229.
The fact that Rich was a homosexual was only discovered because of language
or speech to that effect. Rich told his first sergeant that he was "gay" during a
counseling session. Id. at 1223. A homosexual's status, absent any homosexual
acts, should have been treated, as in the benShalom case, as an "arbitrary"
discharge.
199. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied
sub nom. Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) (military regulations considered
under an intermediate scrutiny test). Contra benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (strict scrutiny applied to the military
regulations).
200. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
201. Beller, 632 F.2d at 810.
202. Id. This is the so-called "heightened solicitude" test. Id. This is a form
of intermediate scrutiny, a middle ground between mere rationality and strict
scrutiny. Using this test of intermediate scrutiny, the court established no
"nexus" between the regulations and the job performance of the soldiers. In
fact, the court was actually satisfied with unsubstantiated military concerns in
upholding the regulations. See supra notes 74-79 for Judge Boochever's scathing attacks of the Beller decision.
203. Moreover, "heightened solicitude" does not sufficiently protect the constitutional rights of military personnel because the test does not call for compelling purposes to be required in impinging constitutional rights. This test merely
requires an important government interest to be invoked. Strict scrutiny
should always be applied when constitutional rights are being impinged. See
supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 79.
205. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (landmark case
demanded a "rational nexus" between sexuality and work performance to justify firing of employee). See generally, Rivera, supra note 23, at 805-29 (overview of federal, state and local, and private employment of homosexuals).
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ees who openly flaunted their lifestyles to the detriment of the government's image. 20 6 In those cases, the employees' job performance
was negatively affected by their sexuality; no similar correlation exists in the military. 20 7 As with race and sex, the military is perpetuating a negative stereotype of homosexuals by deeming them to be
208
per se unsuitable for military service.
The Supreme Court has continuously refused to accept public
hostility to a particular group of people as justification for governmental discrimination against that group. 20 9 In a recent decision
concerning a racially mixed family setting, the Court held that a
state judge could not consider the "real world" existence of racial
prejudice in deciding whether a child should be taken from its natural mother who was living with a black man.2 10 The Court held
211
that "private biases and the possible injury they might inflict"

are not legitimate considerations for the courts. Moreover, Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous court, stated that
although the Constitution cannot control private biases, it will not
tolerate them.2 12 Further, the Chief Justice stated that "private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot directly
or indirectly give them effect." 213 Many of the military's justifications for the exclusion of homosexuals are nothing more than a concession to the biases of the "real world. '2 14 Courts must not accept
such reasoning as well, lest they give biases legal effect.
CONCLUSION

The military remains at cross-purposes with society's changing
206. See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th
Cir. 1976) (dismissal of employee who openly flaunted a gay life style was
proper and justified); Acanfora v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 359 F.
Supp. 843 (Md. 1973) (homosexual teacher who was arbitrarily transferred
sought excessive publicity beyond the needs of his defense and sparked controversy which justified termination of his contract).
207. See, e.g., benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.
Wis. 1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 193-94. No open flaunting
of sexuality could occur in the military context since homosexuals in the military would strive to be discreet in order to avoid being detected and discharged.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
209. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984) (racial prejudice cannot
be considered in deciding an inter-racial child custody case); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1978) (legislation that rests on presumption of "real world"
biases cannot survive scrutiny under the due process clause); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 283 (1978) (state cannot be permitted to classify on presumed notions
of stereotypical sexual roles).
210. Palmore, 104 S.Ct. at 1882.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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attitudes toward sexuality; 215 the regulations are shackled in
archaic classifications established by Defense Department directives of the McCarthy era.216 Courts confronting the question of
homosexual conduct in a military context must defer somewhat to
the uniqueness of the military situation. 21 7 Such deference, however, does not justify the military's overbroad rejection of homosexuals. 2 18

Absent a nexus between

sexuality and military

performance, the military's sweeping, unqualified dismissal of
homosexuals should not be supported or tolerated by our courts.
It is imperative for the military in the United States to remain
strong and prepared for any crises that should arise. However, the
military must not lose sight of the constitutional protections which
are at the core of the American way of life. Every American should
have the opportunity to serve and defend our country without fear
of arbitrary discrimination. The military regulations conflict with
the constitutional right to privacy by excluding homosexuals without question or pause. Although there may be circumstances when
one's sexuality can impede one's ability to serve in the military, this
situation does not often arise.
The military regulations should seek to bar from military service only those homosexuals who have allowed their sexuality to
interfere with their job performance. Such a policy can be achieved
through an open interview process in which some basic questions of
sexuality can be presented to potential recruits. Once a potential
recruit can be assured that homosexuality will not be an absolute
bar to military service, the recruit can freely discuss his or her sexuality. Moreover, should problems arise after recruitment, they
should be handled on a case-by-case basis. The military's concerns
regarding homosexuals are only evident in a few, exceptional cases.
The cases which involve no legitimate military concerns should not
be prejudiced by those rare instances that do illuminate the military's valid concerns. Furthermore, many of the military's concerns
will dissipate with the adoption of a less exclusionary policy toward
homosexuals because the current military policy fosters unnecessary prejudice.
215. See Comment, Homosexual Conduct in the Military: No Faggots in
Military Woodpiles, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 79, 111-112 (military out of synch with
changing views toward homosexuality).
216. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
217. Id. See also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (court expressly
noted "the difference[s] between the diverse civilian community and the much
more tightly regimented military community"). Cf. Warren, The Bill of Rights
and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181-203 (1962) (history of constitutional
rights relating to military service).
218. See Kulieke, supra note 1, at col. 3. See also Murphy, The Soldier's
Right to a Private Life, 24 MIL. L. REV. 97-124 (1964).
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Courts should strictly scrutinize military regulations in order
to afford maximum protection to the individual's right to privacy.
As in the private sector, courts must carefully balance the military
personnel's constitutional privacy rights against legitimate military
concerns. Perhaps the Supreme Court will endeavor to settle the
question of the constitutionality of consensual sexual relations once
and for all. However, until that time comes, courts should use the
previous privacy decisions of the Supreme Court as a basis for supporting the right to be homosexual, both as a soldier and as a
civilian.
ADDENDUM

In the last few weeks prior to publication of this article, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a nine to
seven vote on rehearing en banc, reversed Baker v. Wade,2 19
thereby reinstating Texas' sodomy statute. The majority's decision
disregarded the many conflicting interpretations of the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
for Richmond 220 and stated that "[t]here can be no question but
that the decision of the Supreme Court in Doe was on the merits of
the case. '22 ' Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit insisted that Doe
should be "controlling authority until the Supreme Court itself has
'222
issued an unequivocal statement that Doe no longer controls.
However, it is precisely because the Supreme Court has not issued
an unequivocal statement in this area that inconsistencies persist in
the lower federal courts.223 The court concluded that the statute is
valid because implementing morality is "a permissible state
goal. ' 224 The court disregarded, however, the strong arguments of
the district court relating to the irrationality of creating criminals
225
by statute.
219. No. 82-1590 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 1985) (9-7 decision en banc) (available
Sept. 3, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library).
220. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). For a discussion of Doe and its progeny, see supra
notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
221. No. 82-1590 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 1985) (available Sept. 3, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library). For a discussion of the numerous interpretations of the
Court's summary affirmance of Doe, see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying
text.
222. No. 82-1590 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 1985) (available Sept. 3, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library).
223. Compare id,with Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)
(sodomy statute held violative of fundamental constitutional rights; Doe affirmance should not be considered an endorsement of the lower court reasoning).
224. No. 82-1590 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 1985) (available Sept. 3, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library).
225. For a discussion of the district court opinion, see supra notes 164-69 and
accompanying text; see also supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussion of Robinson and the unconscionability of status criminality).
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The court's decision is troubling not only as to the merits of the
case, but also because the majority "trampl[ed] every procedural
rule it consider[ed]." 226 The Fifth Circuit's decision is just another
addition to the myriad of confusion surrounding the constitutionality of state sodomy statutes. In order to remedy the incorrect result
of this decision, one course of action would be to seek repeal of the
sodomy statute through the Texas legislature. If, however, the case
is brought to the Supreme Court, the Court will undoubtedly sidestep deciding the merits of the sodomy law and reverse on the issue
of standing. 227 A reversal, even on standing, could only bode well
for homosexual's privacy rights in the military and in society at
large.
Harley David Diamond

226. No. 82-1590 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (available
Sept. 3, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library).
227. The bulk of the dissenting opinion questioned the standing of the district attorney of Potter County who intervened when the State's Attorney General dismissed the appeal. Specifically, the dissent maintained that the district
attorney had not borne his burden of proving that his official interests were
inadequately served by the Texas Attorney General. Id

